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I study the e®ects of an ambient charge on the total pollution generated in a duopolistic
industry. Two models are studied in a game-theoretic framework under alternative assump-
tions about returns to scale. Simulation techniques have been used to examine the outcome
of the charge. In both the models it has been shown that for certain values of the demand
and cost parameters of the models the ambient charge increases total pollution from the
industry. The \perverse" results in the models are due to the strategic interaction between
the ¯rms under di®erent technologies.
Key words: Ambient charge, duopoly, returns to scale, environmental regulation, simu-
lation.
JEL Classi¯cation: C-7, D-43, Q281 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to study the e®ects of an ambient charge on the amount of
total pollution generated by a duopolistic industry under alternative assumptions regarding
production technology. Since ambient charges are not as commonly seen in the literature
on environmental pollution as other regulatory instruments such as quantitative standards,
taxes andpermits, a brief descriptionof the ambient charges may be helpful. Under asystem
of ambient charges, the regulator sets a quantitative standard on the total pollution that
can be generated by the industry as a whole. If actual total pollution generated from the
industry exceeds the permissible limit, then each producer in the industry has to pay a ¯ne.
All producers pay the same ¯ne even if the amounts of pollution generated by each of them
is di®erent. Similarly, if the total pollution generated by the entire industry falls short of
the standard set by the regulator, then a uniform subsidy is paid to each producer.
In this paper I study the e®ect of such a system of ¯nes/subsidies (known as ambient
charges) on the total pollution generated by a duopolistic industry on the basis of the di®er-
ence between the benchmark for total pollution set by the regulator and the total pollution
actually arising from the industry.
Quantitative standards, taxes and permits are some of the regulatory instruments that,
unlike ambient charges, have been widely discussed in the literature (Baumol and Oates
(1971), Baumol (1972),Weitzman (1974), Harford (1978), Requate (1993, 1993), Kim et al
(1993), Stimming (1999)). However, these instruments can be used e±ciently only when the
regulator can identify the amounts of pollution generated by individual ¯rms (also known
as the \point source" cases). In real life the regulator ¯nds it di±cult to monitor the
amount of pollution originating from the individual ¯rms.1 In that case it becomes very
di±cult to use instruments such as quantitative standards, emission taxes and permits.
Given this, several authors over the past decade or so (Segerson (1988), Xepapadeas (1991,
1992, 1995)) have considered ambient charges as a possible solution. As I have explained
earlier, implementation of ambient charges requires information about the total pollution
originating in an industry as a whole rather than requiring information about pollution
caused by individual ¯rms. Given the recent intellectual notion of ambient charges, it is
not surprising that so far ambient charges have not been implemented in real life. Despite
1Added to this ambiguity is also the problem of natural phenomena such as wind, rainfall etc. which
a®ect the ambient concentration of pollution.
2this, given the severe information constraints usually faced by the regulators, it seems that
ambient charges that need much less information for its implementation deserves to be
studied in detail.
Authors in the past have studied the e®ects of ambient charges in a competitive market
(Segerson (1988), Xepapadeas (1991, 1992, 1995)). The main purpose of my paper is to
extend the analyses to the case of imperfect competition which is more commonly seen in
real life. More speci¯cally, I study the e®ects of the ambient charge in a duopolistic market.
The basic framework of the paper is as follows. I consider duopolistic ¯rms in a given
region. In the presenceof imperfect information, theregulator is uncertainabout theamount
of pollution from each of these two sources.2 The regulator sets an ambient standard for the
pollutant such that if it is exceeded, producers will be penalized. On the other hand, if the
total pollution is below the standard, producers receive a subsidy. The ¯ne as well as the
subsidy is the same for both producers.
I consider two di®erent games between the regulator and the ¯rms and focus on the
strategic interaction between the duopolists in response to an ambient charge imposed by the
regulator. Each of the two models considers the strategic interaction between the duopolists
under the alternativeassumptionsaboutthe ¯rms' productiontechnologies, namely constant,
decreasing and increasing returns to scale. An important conclusion of the paper is that, in
each of the two models, the strategic interaction between the ¯rms can lead to a \perverse"
e®ect ofambientcharges ontotal pollutionfor certaintypes oftechnologies. That is, for some
types of technologies, an increase in the ambient charge may lead to a greater pollution in
the industry. Simulation techniques are used to show this. In the above models, apart from
the strategic interaction under duopoly, technology plays a very signi¯cant role in deciding
the response of each ¯rm to the ambient charge.
Segerson (1988) introduced ambient charge to induce optimal abatement for one or more
polluters in a perfectly competitive setup. I consider a purely positive analysis with no
optimal abatement.
Xepapadeas (1992)develops adynamic incentive scheme ina perfectly competitiveframe-
work introduced by Segerson (1988) in a static case. I consider an ambient charge in an
imperfect market both in the short run and long run and prove that this instrument may
2Introducing uncertatinty due to natural phenomena such as wind, rainfall etc. does not bring about any
substantial changes in the results in the models here. Hence I rule out uncertainty and assume that the total
pollution generated by the ¯rms is equal to the ambient concentration of the pollution. \Total pollution"
and \ambient concentration" will be used synonymously in the paper.
3increase aggregate pollution under alternative assumptions about production technologies.
Xepapadeas (1995) considers combinations of ambient charges and Pigouvian taxes un-
der stochastic ambient concentration of a pollutant in a perfectly competitive non-point
source pollution (NPSP) framework with risk-averting ¯rms where part of the emissions are
observable.
The next section discusses the basic framework of the models. Section 3 discusses Model
1 and its various cases and presents the results. Section 4 discusses Model 2 along with its
various cases and presents the results. The concluding remarks are presented in section 5.
2 Basic Framework
Iexamine a Cournot duopolistic marketfor goodQ supplied by two ¯rmsindexed by i = 1;2.
Each ¯rm i produces output qi. Market inverse demand is given by P = a¡ bQ where Q =
P2




Pollutionis determined by output in the models as a ¯xedproportionof the total industry
output.3
Ambient Charge Structure: Let ® =
P2
i=1¯i qi represent the total pollutiongenerated
from output Q, given the ¯xed emission coe±cients, ¯1and ¯2. The regulator does not know
how much of the released pollution is transported to a river or to the atmosphere. He can
at best measure the concentration of the pollutant in the water body or atmosphere. The
regulator cannot identify which producer pollutes the most, or the least but can measure the
ambient concentration which is identical to total pollution generated by both ¯rms in the
models.
The ambient chargeisimplementedby comparingthe observedtotal pollutionto aspeci¯c
ambient standard. The ambient standard is set by the regulator and is the cut-o® beyond
which the total pollution is perceived to increase the risk to an unacceptable level. This
¯ne has to be paid by both ¯rms in case the total pollution exceeds the ambient standard
of the pollutant set by the regulator. Again, if the total pollution is less than the ambient
standard, then both ¯rms receive subsidy. The ambient charge is t(® ¡ ®) > 0; where ® is
the speci¯c ambient standard such that if the total pollution exceeds this cut-o®, ® > ®; the
3I assume that output and the polluting input are related by a ¯xed coe±cient technology and there is
no substitutability between polluting and non-polluting inputs. This makes the distinction between output
and input based pollution trivial.
4producers will be penalized by the amount of the charge per unit times the deviation of the
total pollution from the ambient standard. If the level is less than or equal to the cut -o®,
® < ®; the producers may receive a subsidy where t(®¡ ®) < 0: The subsidy is again equal
to the charge per unit times the deviation of the total pollution from the ambient standard.
Each producer pays/receives the same charge/subsidy or \t" per unit of the deviation of the
concentration from the standard4.
My study examines the e®ects of the ambient charge on total pollution in a duopoly
market under various technologies (returns to scale) of the ¯rms.
3 Model 1.
The ¯rst model considers the case where the ¯rms choose their outputs when the charge
is announced and the pollution technologies are given. Here pollution is determined by
output. A proportion of the output namely ¯i is emitted as pollution. I show that, under
increasing returns to scale, an ambient charge may have the \perverse" e®ect of increasing
total pollution for certain values of demand and cost parameters of the model using speci¯c
cost function5. I prove that this possibility does not arise here under constant or decreasing
returns to scale.
In this model the regulator announces the charge; pollution technology (¯1; ¯2) is given
to both the ¯rms and they choose outputs simultaneously. This is of importance in the short
runwhen the ¯rms can only vary output (the variable factor of production) andnot pollution
technology (the ¯xed factor of production). In each of the three cases described below, the
aim is to examine the e®ects of the ambient charge on total pollution. The generalized cost
function is used when the expression
@®¤
@t
is unambiguous. The speci¯c cost function is
used whenever the expression
@®¤
@t
is proved to be ambiguous when using a generalized cost
function.
3.1 Case 1. (CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE)
Let the cost function for ¯rm i be written as Ci = Ci (qi;¯i) where i = 1;2
which satis¯es the following properties,
4The formulation of the ambient charge in the paper follows directly from Segerson (1988) without the
¯xed penalty imposed whenever the ambient standard is exceeded.







= 0: Marginal Cost is positive but there is no change in marginal cost due
to a change in output. This represents the constant returns to scale industry case.
Let the pro¯t equation for each ¯rm be
¼i = [a ¡ b(qi + qj)]qi ¡ Ci(qi;¯i) ¡ t(® ¡ ®);i;j = 1;2;i 6= j
From the ¯rst order conditions of pro¯t maximization,
a ¡ 2bqi ¡ bqj ¡
@Ci
@qi
¡ t¯i = 0;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j (1)
and the reaction functions are
qi =
Ã
















i + t(¯j ¡ 2¯i)
i
3b
;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j (3)

























Assume ¯i = µ¯j; i;j = 1;2;i 6= j for simplicity where µ is real. Here µ is introduced to
show the relation between the pollution technologies of the two ¯rms.
It can be shown that
@®¤
@t
< 0 for all values of the parameters in the model.
Thus the e®ect of an ambient charge is to reduce total pollution under constant returns
to scale in a Cournot duopoly game.
3.2 Case 2. (DECREASING RETURNS TO SCALE)
Let the cost function of ¯rm i be written as Ci(qi;¯i) where i = 1;2







> 0;i = 1;2: Marginal cost is positive and increasing at an increasing
rate with an increase in output of each ¯rm. Hence this cost function represents decreasing
returns to scale technology.




That is, e®ect of an ambient charge is to reduce total pollution under decreasing returns
to scale in a Cournot duopoly game.
3.3 Case 3. (INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE)
Using a generalized cost function does not allow me to prove any unambiguous e®ect of the
ambient charge on total pollution. However, it is possible to demonstrate using a speci¯c
cost function that the e®ect of the ambient charge on total pollution depends on the values
of the demand and cost parameters of the model. Iuse simulation techniques to demonstrate
these results.
Consider an industry with the following cost function
Ci = mi +niqi + ciq2
i;i = 1;2 (4)
where mi > 0;ni > 0;ci < 0: Hence Cqi > 0 provided qi > ¡
ni
2ci
; Cqiqi < 0:6
The marginal cost with respect to output is positive and the marginal cost increases at a
diminishing rate. These properties of the cost function represent increasing returns to scale
case here.
Let the pro¯t equation of each ¯rm be written as the following
¼i = [a ¡ b(qi + qj)]qi ¡ (mi + niqi + ciq2
i) ¡ t(® ¡ ®);i;j = 1;2;i 6= j
From the ¯rst order condition of pro¯t maximization
@¼i
@qi
= 0;i = 1;2
a ¡ 2bqi ¡ bqj ¡ ni ¡ 2ciqi ¡ ¯it = 0;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j (5)
which give the reaction functions
(a ¡ bqj ¡ ni ¡ ¯it)
2(b+ ci)
= qi;i 6= j;i;j = 1;2 (6)
After calculations, the optimal outputs in terms of the parameters of the model are





[a(b +2c2) ¡ 2(b+c2)n1 +bn2 + tfb¯2 ¡ 2¯1(b+ c2)g]





[a(b +2c1) ¡ 2(b+c1)n2 +bn1 + tfb¯1 ¡ 2¯2(b+ c1)g]
4(b+ c1)(b+ c2) ¡ b2 (8)





[4(b +c1)(b +c2) ¡ b2]
[¯1f2¯1(b+ c2) ¡ ¯2bg +¯2f2¯2(b+c1) ¡ ¯1bg] (9)
Assume again, as before that ¯1 = µ¯2:
Now, it can be shown that
@®¤
@t
> 0 for ¯1 = µ¯2 for di®erent values of µ;c1;c2 and b:
Thus an increase in the ambient charge may increase total pollution for certain values of
the cost and demand parameters of the model.










It canbeproved that the expected result i.e.
@®¤
@t
< 0 holdwhen jc1j < 0:5 and jc2j < 0:5:
Thus I show that, depending on the values of the cost and demand parameters of the
model, an increase in the ambient charge may increase or decrease total pollution. This can
be of interest for environmental policy formation as in an imperfect market operating under
increasing returns to scale the regulator may not be successful in decreasing total pollution
by increasing the ambient charge arbitrarily.
However, when ¯1 = ¯2 = k, c1 = ¡0:5;c2 = ¡0:5; for b = 1;
@®¤
@t
> 0 for 0 < k < 1:
Thus when the ¯rms are identical in terms ofpollutiontechnology andproductiontechnology
(increasing returns to scale), for a certain value of the parameters namely, c1 = ¡0:5;c2 =
¡0:5; for b = 1;the perverse result comes through once again.
The \perverse" result that ambient charge increases total pollution for certain values of
the demand and cost parameters of the model is due to the strategic interaction of the ¯rms




jc1j ¸ 0:5 and jc2j ¸ 0:5:






4(b +c1)(b +c2) ¡ b2 > 0 means that fb¯1¡2¯2(b+c1)g < 0 which means ¯1 > ¯2: Thus, it
can be shown that for certain values of the demand and cost parameters ofthe model, output
of the more polluting ¯rm increases and the output of the less polluting ¯rm decreases with
an increase in the ambient charge. This provides an explanation as to why an increase in
the ambient charge may increase total pollution for certain demand and cost parameters of
the model. Given this, so long as the output of the less polluting ¯rm does not fall \too
much" as compared to the increase in the output of the more polluting ¯rm, there arises the
possibility of an increase in total pollution with an increase in the ambient charge. This is
what seems to be happening in the \perverse" case discussed above.
4 Model 2
In the second model, ¯rms choose technologies in the ¯rst period and the outputs in the
following period after the charge is announced. HereI prove, using speci¯c cost functions and
simulation techniques, that in all cases, namely, constant, increasing and decreasing returns
to scale technologies, total pollution may increase with the charge. Method of backward
induction is applied to solve for the ¯rms' outputs and the pollution technologies. Assuming
that the ¯rms have already made their choices about their technologies, the values of the
optimal outputs arefound in the last stage ofthe game fromthe pro¯t maximizationexercise.
In the ¯rst stage of the game the optimal values of the pollution technologies are solved for
in terms of ambient charge and demand and cost parameters of the model.
For all the three cases considered below, generalized cost functions produce ambiguous
results on the total pollutiondue to the ambient charge. Hence to demonstrate this fact I use
speci¯c demand and cost functions for constant, decreasing and increasing returns to scale
technologies. It is shown for all the three cases in Model 2 how the ambient charge brings
about increases in the total pollution for various values of the demand and cost parameters
of the model.
4.1 Case 1. (CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE)
Let the demand function be p = 1¡ q1 ¡ q2 for simplicity where a = 1;b = 1:
9Ci = ´iqi ¡ ¯i;i = 1;2 (10)
where ´i > 0;¯i > 0:
HenceCqi > 0;Cqiqi = 0;C¯i < 0: Thesigns have the same meanings as illustratedbefore.
This is a special case of the cost function used in Model 1, Case 3 as the cost function is
assumed to be separable in output and pollution technology.
For simplicity of calculations, it is
¼i = (1¡ qi ¡ qj)qi ¡ ´iqi +¯i ¡ t(®¡ ®);i;j = 1;2;i 6= j
By the method of backward induction, solving for the level of output assuming that the




= 0;i = 1;2
which implies,
1¡ 2qi ¡ qj ¡ mi ¡ t¯i = 0;i = 1;2;i 6= j (11)
and output reaction functions are
qi =
1¡ qj ¡´i ¡ t¯i
2
;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j: (12)
After calculations, the optimal outputs are
q¤
1 =






[1+ ´1 ¡2´2 + t(¯1 ¡ 2¯2)]
3
(14)
Now consider the ¯rst stage of the game where the ¯rms choose the optimal pollution
technologies in terms of the charge, the demand and the cost parameters of the model.
Substituting the values of q¤
1 and q¤










i + ¯i ¡ t(®¤ ¡ ®);i;j = 1;2;i 6= j
Solving for the pollution technologies, assuming that outputs have already been chosen,
the ¯rst order condition for pro¯t maximization
@¼i
@¯i















= 1;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j
After calculations, the pollution technology reaction functions are











;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j: (15)
which give
¯j ¡ ¯i =
4(mi ¡ mj)
5t
;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j (16)


















;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j:







¡ 20+ 12mi + 8mj
¶
;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j (17)








































For various combinations of the parameters of the model, the perverse result comes
through in the constant returns to scale case of this more complicated model where the





> 0 for various combinations of m1;m2 and t: (Please see Ap-
pendix).
11Here in case of constant returns to scale industry, total pollution increases with the
charge for certain values of the parameters of the model. This, like before, will have the







> 0 implies that ¯2 > 2¯1. The output of the less polluting ¯rm
increases andthe output of the more polluting ¯rm decreases with an increase in the ambient
charge in the last stage of the game. This, however, may explain why the ambient charge
increases total pollution for certain parameter values of the model when the decrease in the
output of the more polluting ¯rm is less than the increase in the output of the less polluting
¯rm. However, in the ¯rst stage of the game it can be shown that an increase in the ambient
charge may increase both ¯1 and ¯2 which makes the \perverse " case stronger. The ¯nal
outcome is a combination of the two stages of the game which contributes to the \perverse"
result.
4.2 Case2. (DECREASING RETURNS TO SCALE)
Let the cost function be
Ci = q
2
i ¡ ¯i;i = 1;2: (18)
where Cq > 0;Cqq > 0 and C¯i > 0: Here the signs have the usual meanings as before.
This cost function is also a special case of the speci¯c cost function used in Model 1 Case 3
as here cost function is assumed to be separable in output and pollution technology.
Then the pro¯t equation of each ¯rm is
¼i = (1¡ qi ¡ qj)qi ¡ q2
i +¯i ¡ t(® ¡®);i = 1;2;i 6= j:
As in Case 1 of Model 3 above, following the method of backward induction, outputs of
the two ¯rms have been solved for.
From the ¯rst order condition of pro¯t maximization,
@¼i
@qi
= 0;i = 1;2
which gives
1¡ 2qi ¡ qj ¡ t¯i = 0;i = 1;2;i 6= j (19)
and the output reaction functions
qi =
(1¡ qj ¡ t¯i)
4
;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j (20)





[3 +(¯i ¡ 4¯j)t]
15
;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j: (21)
Now, as before, in the ¯rst stage of the game, knowing what the optimal levels of the
outputs are, the optimal values of the pollution technologies are being solved for by the two
¯rms in terms of the parameters of the model and the ambient charge.











i + ¯i ¡ t(®¤¡ ®);i = 1;2;i 6= j:














¡ 1 = 0;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j: (22)
Solving, the pollution technologies are identical. This is not surprising, given that the
cost function is separable in both outputs and pollution technology for both the ¯rms.
¯1 =
48t¡ 225
256t2 = ¯2 (23)















(Please see Appendix). Thus in the case of decreasing returns to scale technology, ambient
charge increases total pollution for certain initial values of the ambient charge. This again
implies that the regulator may increase the ambient charge arbitrarily and \perverse" results
in terms of increased pollution can follow.







>0 if ¯1 > 4¯2 which means that the output
of the more polluting ¯rm increases and the output of the less polluting ¯rm decreases with







> 0: The combination of both the e®ects of the charge in the two
stages of the game along with strategic interaction between the ¯rms may contribute to the
increase in total pollution due to the ambient charge.
4.3 Case3. (INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE)
Using even the simplest of cost functions has proved to be very complicated and so I have
used the following cost and demand functions with particular parameter values.
Let the market demand function be p = a ¡ 1
4(q1 +q2):
and





i ¡ ¯i (25)
and with the usual signs of the partial derivatives. Separability of the cost function in












¡ t(® ¡ ®);i;j = 1;2;i 6= j:
Solving similarly as before, for the level of output assuming that the technology is already
chosen by the ¯rms,
@¼i
@qi














(t¯2 +2t¯1+ 3¡ 3a); i;j = 1;2:i 6= j: (27)
Now considering the second last stage of the game where the ¯rms choose optimal pollu-














i ¡ ¯i) ¡ t(®¤ ¡ ®) i = 1;2;i 6= j:


























2¯i¡4t¡4at = 0;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j: (28)
14Again, as before in Case 2 of Model 2, the pollution technologies are identical.




t¯ + 1¡ a
´
;i = 1;2:i 6= j: (30)




18+ 16at¡ 32t¡ 16a
4¡ 3t
(31)




t(4¡ 3t)2[388a ¡ 276¡ 960at¡ 160a2 + 320a2t+ 640at] ¡ (54+ 388at¡ 276t
¡480at2 ¡ 160a2t+ 160a2t2 + 320at2 ¡ 48a)(16¡ 48t+27t2)
t2(4¡ 3t)4




Thus an increase in the ambient charge may increase total pollution for certain initial
values of the ambient charges and for certain parameter values of the model. This again, as
before has important policy recommendations.





















if ¯1 > ¯2: Thus the pollution technology of the more polluting ¯rm will increase more
than the pollution technology of the less polluting ¯rm. The combination of the results in
stage one and stage two of the game may bring about the \perverse" result.
5 CONCLUSION
For various speci¯cations of the cost functions and under di®erent returns to scale assump-
tions anambient charge can increase total pollution in aduopolistic market under alternative
assumptions about returns to scale. Quantitative standards, tradable permits and emission
taxes havebeen studiedand implemented tocontrol pollutionfrom point sources of pollution.
Ambient charges have been only studied so far for controlling pollution sources under perfect
competition. The results in previous studies (Segerson (1998), Xepapadeas (1992, 1995)),
15depended on the assumptions of a perfectly competitive set-up under uncertainty.7 The
\perverse" results in the models in this paper are due to the strategic interaction between
¯rms operating under di®erent returns to scale. The results have important consequences
for environmental policy formation. This paper is particularly important in so far as the
standard instruments cannot e±ciently control total pollution due to lack of information
about each source. In this paper I show that in a duopoly market ambient charge is not only
ine®ective in controlling ambient concentration of the pollutant but in fact may result in
\perverse"outcomes for certain parameter values of the models. Hence the ambient charges
may not be the best solution for controlling total pollution in the presence of imperfect
market conditions and potential strategic interaction between the ¯rms under alternative
assumptions about returns to scale.
7One point of di®erence here is that uncertainty of weather is not considered. As mentioned before,
introduction of uncertainty does not bring about any substantial changes in the results.
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